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1. Introduction 
The transfer of political power and fiscal resources to sub-national tiers of government has 
been traditionally justified on identity grounds and heterogeneous preferences across 
jurisdictions (e.g., De Winter and Tursan, 1998; Oates, 1999). More recently however, a 
different argument has been proposed to support decentralization, namely that (fiscal) 
decentralization creates incentives for local officials that make them more accountable 
towards their citizens, hence improving the performance of their jurisdictions (e.g., 
Bardhan, 2002; Weingast, 2009). 
While the theoretical literature is unanimous, empirical evidence is less supportive. For 
instance, critics point out that decentralization can lead to an increase in both the size and 
the number of bureaucracies (e.g., Reverte-Cejudo and Sánchez-Bayle, 1999; Repullo, 2007), 
and additionally to an uneven geographical distribution of benefits (e.g., Martınez-Vazquez 
and McNab, 2003). However, the empirical literature on the impact of decentralization on 
inequality is relatively scarce and provides mixed results (e.g., McKinnon, 1997; Qian and 
Weingast, 1997; Cheshire and Gordon, 1998; Shankar and Shah, 2003; Gil et al., 2004; 
Rodriguez-Poze and Ezcurra, 2010).  
The distributional concerns become particularly apparent when considering specific 
policies. In this paper we concentrate on health care, and ask what are the consequences of 
fiscal decentralization on health disparities. The decentralization of health policy 
responsibilities is quite common around the world, even in unitary states (e.g., Saltman et 
al., 2007; Costa-Font and Greer, 2013). The central government typically devolves political 
authority to sub-national governments, who can then autonomously legislate on health care 
issues and decide how to spend monies (political and spending decentralization). But it can 
also assign fiscal autonomy to lower-tier governments, by granting them independent 
sources of revenue to finance the provision of services (fiscal decentralization). 
Our focus is on the Italian National Health Service (NHS). The NHS was established in 
1978, replacing the previous system based on insurance funds, with the declared goal of 
improving equity by providing uniform and comprehensive healthcare services across the 
country. However, healthcare expenditure increased steadily over time, and at the 
beginning of the 1990s the central government introduced reforms aimed at capping 
spending growth. These reforms shifted the responsibility of both managing and funding 
the services towards regional jurisdictions. Their declared aim was to improve spending 
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efficiency by increasing regional governments’ accountability via fiscal autonomy (e.g., 
Bordignon and Turati, 2009; Ferrario and Zanardi, 2011; Piacenza and Turati, 2014). 
However, some scholars have questioned the overall welfare consequences of 
decentralization, which – despite improving efficiency – might have sharpened the existing 
differences in the access and quality of care across regions. In particular, critics point out 
that the richest regions could exploit substantial tax bases after devolution, and then spend 
more. As a consequence, between-regional inequalities might increase, and welfare in 
poorer regions might decrease. 
But this argument fails to take into account that in Italy, as in other countries, fiscal 
decentralization has come together with (i) equalization grants to substantially remove 
differences in the tax bases, and (ii) constitutional rules defining a mandatory uniform 
provision of a quasi-universal set of services across the country (e.g., Costa-Font and Turati, 
2017). As a consequence, following fiscal decentralization, the relative distribution of 
resources across regions should remain substantially stable, but the composition of funding 
across those same regions could change significantly. In particular, rich regions should be 
increasingly financed with more autonomous sources of funds1. And, according to both the 
theoretical and the empirical literature on fiscal federalism, the lower the share of transfers 
from central government sources to finance local spending, the higher will be the 
accountability of local officials (e.g., Weingast, 2009; Eyraud and Lusinyan, 2013). 
What are the consequences on health disparities of increasing the share of local taxes to 
finance regional health spending? In this paper we assess the impact of fiscal 
decentralization of health care funding on between- and within-regional disparities in self-
assessed health. We exploit a reform increasing fiscal autonomy of Italian regions since 1998 
which had clear and substantial consequences on the composition of funding (e.g., Eyraud 
and Lusinyan, 2013, Fig. 4). The regional setting of the Italian NHS and the wide variation 
in the size of the tax bases offer a unique opportunity to this end. Our main finding 
suggests that fiscal decentralization helped contain health disparities within more fiscally 
autonomous regions, in a period in which within-region health inequalities were on the rise. 
According to our estimates, the impact on the inequality index has been on average about 
three times its within-region standard deviation, with much stronger effects in richer 
regions compared to poorer ones. This result has been obtained without any major effect on 
between-regional health disparities and without decreasing average perceived health. 
                                                                          
1 The gap between sub-national government’ own revenue and spending identifies in the literature on fiscal 
federalism the Vertical Fiscal Imbalance (VFI). See, e.g., Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013). 
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Our work is related to the growing literature studying the impact of decentralization on a 
variety of health outcomes, which provides empirical results that are often mixed and 
inconclusive (e.g., Jepsson and Okuonzi, 2000; Tang and Bloom, 2000; Bossert et al., 2003; 
Akin et al., 2005; Arreondo et al., 2005; Kolehmainen-Aitken, 2005; Saltman et al., 2007; 
Jimenez-Rubio, 2011; Jimenez-Rubio and Garcia-Gomez, 2017). In work considering the 
Italian NHS, most have focused on the relationship between decentralization and the 
efficiency of health policies, providing strong support to the argument that fiscal 
decentralization makes local governments more accountable (e.g., Bordignon and Turati, 
2009; Francese et al., 2014; Piacenza and Turati, 2014; Cavalieri and Ferrante, 2016). As for 
the impact on inequalities, studies available so far (not only in economics) have discussed 
the between-regional dimension of disparities, finding mixed evidence on the impact of 
decentralization (e.g., De Belvis, 2012; Toth, 2014; Blöchliger et al., 2016; Costa-Font and 
Turati, 2017). 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides essential 
background information on the fiscal decentralization reform. Section 3 provides 
descriptive evidence on the impact of the reform on the outcome of interest. Section 4 
presents the empirical strategy. Estimates are discussed in section 5, while section 6 
provides brief concluding remarks. 
2. Institutional background: fiscal decentralization in Italy 
The Italian NHS is a regional system designed according to the Republican Constitution 
(e.g., Turati, 2014). Regional governments have the right to legislate on the organization and 
the supply of health care services and to allocate spending, albeit this right is limited by the 
legislative framework set by the central government.2 Particularly important, in this respect, 
is the definition of a quasi-universal set of services to be offered across all territories. This 
provision limits the autonomy of regional governments to enlarge the set of services 
publicly provided3. However, it also facilitates the comparison of access and quality of 
services locally supplied across different regional governments. 
                                                                          
2 Regions are the level of government directly below the central government, and above provinces and 
municipalities. There are 20 regions in Italy, and they vary widely in terms of size, population, and per-capita 
GDP. Five of these regions historically enjoy a Special Statute, meaning they are allowed a higher degree of 
autonomy. 
3 A striking example is dental care, which is only marginally included in the set of services identified by the 
central government to be provided across all regions. None of the regional governments have used the 
available degree of fiscal autonomy to supply their citizens with this service, likely because the costs involved 
would be too high even for rich regions. 
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According to independent reviewers, the Italian health care system is one of the best 
performers at the global level.4 However, this good performance at national level hides 
important differences across regions, and there is unequivocal evidence showing a 
deterioration in the performance of regional health care systems, moving from the North to 
the South of the country (e.g., Turati, 2014). For instance, the Ministry of Health carries out a 
yearly evaluation exercise to verify whether regional governments are effectively supplying 
the set of services constitutionally guaranteed. The evaluation is based on a set of indicators 
which are summed to obtain a final score; if the score is above a given threshold, then it is 
assumed that the regional governments fulfill the Constitutional mandate. Since the 
beginning of this exercise in 2001, most of the Southern regions have been unable to reach 
the minimum threshold required.5 
The gradient in regional performances mirrors differences in income: the Italian 
Mezzogiorno – the Southern part of Italy – is poorer than the Northern part of the country. 
The persistently uneven distribution of income across regions had striking consequences 
when – during the Nineties – the central government reformed NHS funding, to match 
political and spending decentralization with fiscal decentralization. The main motivation 
behind the reform was to increase accountability at the local level (e.g., Eyraud and 
Lusinyan, 2013). Theory predicts that greater accountability would have been obtained by 
reducing transfers from the central government. In turn, more accountability would have 
produced an improvement in spending efficiency. To pursue this aim, following a first 
attempt in 1993, in 1998 the central government substituted transfers from the centre with 
two new autonomous sources of revenue for regions: a new regional tax on value added 
(IRAP), and a regional surcharge on the Personal Income Tax (Addizionale Regionale IRPEF). 
The reason for substituting transfers with own revenues was to exploit the potential gains 
of decentralization while respecting the constitutional provision of uniform levels of care to 
be guaranteed by the central government in all regions. As transfers from the central 
government were cut by an amount equivalent to the increase in autonomous revenues for 
all regions, the reform did not modify the relative amount of resources for each region’s 
budget for health (which increased over time), but it did change differently for different 
regions the composition of funding according to the tax base available in each jurisdiction. 
                                                                          
4 See, e.g., http://www.bloomberg.com/infographics/2014-09-15/most-efficient-health-care-around-the-
world.html.  
5 See, e.g., the most recent official report (in Italian) published by the Ministry of Health at 
http://www.salute.gov.it/imgs/C_17_pubblicazioni_2245_allegato.pdf. 
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To understand the magnitude of the impact, consider Figure 1, where we plot the share of 
healthcare spending financed by IRAP and IRPEF. At the national level, this share is around 
40% of total spending. However, since income is unevenly distributed across regions and 
the tax bases of the two new regional taxes are strictly positively related to GDP, the impact 
of the decentralization reform on fiscal autonomy was also unequal. In Lombardy, the 
richest region, IRAP and IRPEF cover as much as 60% of spending; in Calabria, the poorest 
region, the two new taxes fund about 10% of spending. In general, richer Northern regions 
experienced a larger reduction of transfers with respect to Southern regions, who continued 
to mostly rely on grants from the centre to fund healthcare spending. Own revenues 
represent about half of revenues in Centre-Northern regions, while they are just 15% in 
Southern ones (e.g., Turati, 2014). As theory predicts, changes in the efficiency of health 
spending management were also estimated to be different across regions, with efficiency in 
Northern regions increasing more than in Southern ones (Bordignon and Turati, 2009; 
Piacenza and Turati, 2014; Cavalieri and Ferrante, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 1. Share of healthcare spending financed with regional taxes 
3. Data and preliminary descriptive evidence 
In order to obtain regional measures of inequality we consider individual-level data drawn 
from the 1994–2007 cross-sectional Survey on the Daily Life of Italian Households (“Indagine 
Multiscopo sulle Famiglie – Aspetti della Vita Quotidiana”) carried out yearly by the Italian 
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Institute of Statistics (ISTAT).6 The survey encompasses a sample of 20,000 Italian 
households (60,000 individuals) living across Italy, and is representative of the whole 
population.7 We limit our analysis to those over 16 years old living in one of the 15 
Ordinary Statute Regions.8 
Self-assessed health (SAH) is our indicator for general health. SAH has been widely used in 
the literature examining the relationship between health, socio-economic status and life-
styles (e.g., Kenkel, 1994; Contoyannis and Jones, 2004; Balia and Jones, 2008). Moreover, 
SAH has been shown to be a good predictor of mortality and morbidity (e.g., Idler and 
Beyamini, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1998), and to have a strong correlation with more complex 
health and well-being indices (e.g., Unden and Elofosson, 2006). As in other similar surveys 
around the world, respondents are asked the following question: “Would you say that in 
general your health is: very bad (1), bad (2), fair (3), good (4), very good (5)”.9 SAH is clearly 
measured on an ordinal and categorical scale, and it requires appropriate statistical tools for 
the analysis. 
We begin our analysis by briefly discussing the evolution of between-regional inequality. 
Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics on the development of SAH across all regions, 
before (1994-1997) and after (1998-2007) the fiscal decentralization reform. For both the 
median value of SAH and the percentage of individuals responding having “good” and 
                                                                          
6 Data concerning 2004 are not included in the analysis since the survey did not take place. We also do not 
consider data after 2007 since the incentive mechanism stemming from fiscal decentralization was substituted 
by centralized Recovery Plans for regional governments in deficit. Additionally, ISTAT changed the wording 
of the question on self-assessed health in 2008. 
7 As common when using individual survey data, we use survey stratification weights provided by ISTAT in 
all our models. Survey stratification weights are defined during survey sampling by the provider of the data 
and are essential to make the analysis representative of the entire population. 
8  Special Statute Regions in the North and in the South have been excluded because they follow different rules 
and are characterized by different degrees of fiscal autonomy. Interestingly, the inclusion of these regions in 
the sample strengthen our main conclusions. Results obtained for the full sample of Italian regions are briefly 
discussed in section 5.2 and do not affect our main conclusions.  
9 Notice that when individuals are faced with an instrument comprising ordinal response categories, their 
interpretation of response categories may systematically differ across populations or populations sub-groups, 
also depending on their preferences and norms (Bago d’Uva et al., 2008; Rice et al., 2012). In such cases a given 
level of health is unlikely to be rated equally by all respondents. This phenomenon has been termed 
“reporting heterogeneity”. In order to check that reporting heterogeneity is not a relevant issue for our 
analysis, we have computed the correlation between self-reported health and a more objective indicator of 
health, constructed through responses to fairly precise questions about specific health conditions. To build this 
summary measure, we use the number of health conditions reported by the respondents during the interview 
(heart problems, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, lung disease, asthma, arthritis, 
osteoporosis, cancer, ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or femoral fracture, psychological problems). For 
each year, we run an ordered probit regression model in which the independent variable is SAH and the 
dependent variable is the summary indicator of health conditions. The adjusted R2 of the model tends to be 
constant and equal to about 15% for all years. Hence, SAH appears as strongly predictive of the summary 
health index. Moreover, the results of a chi-square test shows a large and statistically significant correlation 
between the two variables, since, for each year, their correlation coefficients tend to be constant and equal 
approximately 60%. 
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“very good” health, we compute the mean and the coefficient of variation (CV) across 
regions for the two sub-periods. Neither measure shows substantial changes over time; but 
more importantly, the between-regional disparities in health outcomes (as measured by CV) 
decreased slightly. This evidence confirms the view that the tax decentralization reform has 
not exacerbated health disparities between regions, largely because a system of equalization 
grants was implemented (e.g., Costa-Font and Turati, 2017). It is also worth noting that the 
average per capita public health expenditure significantly increased by roughly 500 euro 
after the reform, while the coefficient of variation across regions slightly decreased, thus 
revealing also a reduction in between-regional disparities in health spending. 
 
Variable 
DECENTR = 0 
1994-1997 
DECENTR = 1 
1998-2007 
t-test of the 
difference (p-value) 
Average “median SAH” 4.533 4.411 0.002 
CV of “median SAH” 0.113 0.107 0.079 
Average % “good”/”very good” 0.764 0.754 0.124 
CV of % “good”/”very good” 0.040 0.032 0.001 
Average of per capita public health exp. (€) 900 1382 0.006 
CV of per capita public health exp. 0.099 0.071 0.005 
 
Table 1. Average and coefficient of variation (CV) across regions of health outcomes and per 
capita public health expenditure in the years before and after the reform 
 
In order to provide a more detailed view of the dynamics of health outcomes across regions, 
Figures 2a and 2b show the evolution of the median value of SAH and the percentage of 
individuals responding having “good” and “very good” health over the years from 1993 to 
2007 respectively. In each figure, we present the average across all regions (green line), and 
the averages across the sub-samples of regions with (average) per-capita GDP below and 
above the sample mean value (“low-GDP” regions, red line; “high-GDP” regions, blue line). 
Figure 2a shows that median SAH is generally constant over time, with a very slight 
decrease in both the high- and low-GDP regions. In 1993, the average median SAH is 4.2 
and 5 for the high-GDP and low-GDP regions respectively, while in 2007 it is 4 and 4.7 for 
the high-GDP and low-GDP regions respectively. Interestingly, the average median value of 
SAH in the low-GDP (high-GDP) regions is always above (below) the national average. 
More importantly, the distance between the low-GDP and high-GDP regions in terms of 
median SAH is quite stable across the time span considered, which further supports the 
 9
view that health disparities between regions did not increase after the tax decentralization 
reform. A similar pattern is found for the evolution of the percentage of individuals 
reporting “good” and “very good” health (Figure 2b). 
 
 
Figure 2a. Average median value of SAH, by year 
 
 
Figure 2b. Average % of individuals reporting “good”/“very good” health, by year 
 
Turning now to within-regional variation in SAH, we make use of the innovative inequality 
index developed by Kobus and Milos (2012), a generalization of the Abul Naga and Yalcin 
(2008) index. The KM inequality index is “median based” (and not “mean based” as the 
3
4
5
5.
5
av
er
ag
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
SA
H
1993 1995 1998 2000 2005 2007
year
high-GDP Regions low-GDP Regions
all Regions
.6
5
.7
.7
5
.8
.8
5
av
er
ag
e 
%
 g
oo
d/
ve
ry
 g
oo
d
1993 1995 1998 2000 2005 2007
year
high-GDP Regions low-GDP Regions
all Regions
 10
more traditional inequality indexes) and lies in the interval [0, 1]. The average value of the 
KM index (computed using symmetric weights for inequalities below and above the 
median) across regions and years is approximately 0.4 (Table 2), relatively high in 
comparison to other European countries studied in the still limited literature using median-
based inequality indexes.10 Figures 3a and 3b illustrate the evolution of the KM index over 
the period 1994-2007 for low-GDP regions (the less fiscally autonomous, Figure 3a) and for 
high-GDP regions (those more fiscally autonomous, Figure 3b). It is difficult to gauge a 
common pattern, but health inequalities in the first group of regions seems to increase after 
the fiscal decentralization reform, whereas inequality in the second group of regions 
appears relatively stable across the whole period.  
This suggests that higher fiscal autonomy is associated with reduced inequality and we 
now turn our attention to identifying this relationship using a formal econometric model.  
 
 
Figure 3a. KM index in regions with per-capita GDP below the mean, by region and year 
 
 
                                                                          
10 For instance, Abul Naga and Yalcin (2008) estimated an average level of inequality in self-assessed health 
across seven regions in Switzerland of 0.208. Madden (2010) reported an inequality index in SAH ranging 
from 0.356 in 2003 to 0.333 in 2006 for Ireland. 
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Figure 3b. KM index in regions with per-capita GDP above the mean, by region and year 
4. The empirical strategy 
4.1. Identification 
In order to investigate the impact of the fiscal decentralization reform on within-regional 
health inequalities measured by the KM index, we exploit the differences in the level of 
income across the Italian regions. In particular, regions characterized by a higher per-capita 
income – hence, a higher tax base for the two new sources of own revenue – have become 
more fiscally autonomous than regions with a lower per-capita income (Figure 1)11. And, in 
turn, this would have made local politicians more accountable towards their citizens in rich 
regions than in poor ones. We exploit between- and within-regional variability in current 
GDP and adopt a multivalued treatment approach (e.g., Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). Our 
general model specification is the following: 
KMit = Ri + Tt + β GDPit×DECENTRt +  Xit’δ + it         [1] 
                                                                          
11 We do not consider revenues from IRAP and IRPEF since these would clearly suffer a problem of 
endogeneity. 
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where KMit is our inequality measure in Region i at time t; Ri denotes a full set of region-
specific effects, Tt denotes a full set of year-specific effects, Xit is a vector of controls, and it 
is a disturbance term. Standard errors are robust, clustered at the regional level to capture 
potential serial correlation in the residual error term, in all estimated models.  
The average causal impact of the tax decentralization reform is captured by the coefficient β 
on the interaction term GDPit×DECENTRt, where DECENTRt is a dummy equal to 0 in the 
pre-reform period and equal to 1 from 1998 onwards. Our identification strategy relies on 
two assumptions. First, the degree of exposure to treatment (GDP) should be conditionally 
uncorrelated with the outcome variable (KM). This means assuming that current GDP is 
orthogonal to the current level of inequality in perceived health, once controlling for time 
and regional fixed effects as well as a number of additional covariates. However, despite 
this specification, one might be worried that inequalities in health reflect inequalities in 
income, and that these inequalities in health are (negatively) correlated with the level of 
GDP. In the robustness section below we address this concern by using a pre-treatment 
variable as an exogenous alternative measure of the degree of exposure. 
A second key assumption for the validity of our identification strategy is that the outcomes 
in regions differently exposed to treatment follow the same trend before the reform takes 
effect. As suggested by a large literature in econometrics (e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009), in 
order to test the common trend assumption, one can augment a standard difference-in-
differences (DiD) regression model to include leading values of the treatment variable. If 
such leads were associated with the outcome variable, it would indicate that our results 
might be due to time trends in regions in the treatment group being systematically different 
from time trends in regions in the control group. The practice of including anticipatory 
effects in a DiD regression model to test the validity of the common trend assumption is 
widespread among health economics scholars (e.g. Wing et al., 2018) and may be easily 
accommodated in our multivalued treatment framework. 12 In the analysis below, we then 
augment Eq. [1] with a full set of anticipatory effects (leads) of the treatment. When using 
this augmented specification of Eq. [1], we also consider post-treatment effects (lags) to test 
whether the impact of the reform was delayed over time.  
Finally, a potential problem with the linear model specification we adopt is that it may not 
be a good representation of the data generating process for a variable assuming only values 
                                                                          
12 For instance, this practice is adopted by Bachhuber et al. (2014) when studying the relationship between 
medical cannabis laws and opioid overdose mortality, and by Raifman et al. (2017) when investigating the 
relationship between same-sex marriage laws and adolescent suicide attempts. 
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between [0, 1] as the KM inequality index, since fitted values might stay outside the relevant 
interval (e.g., Wooldridge 2002). To support the robustness of our model specification, we 
then check whether fitted values of the inequality index from the estimated models are 
bounded in the interval [0, 1]. 
4.2. Confounding factors  
Controls Xit in equation [1] include several confounding factors which may vary both across 
regions and over time. In particular, we consider two main groups of covariates: a) 
measures of within-regional inequality in healthcare services utilization and in lifestyles; b) 
regional demographic and socio-economic characteristics. 
Both the use of healthcare services and lifestyles have been recognized as important 
determinants of inequality in health (e.g., Mackenbach, 2012, 2014). To build suitable 
inequality measures in these two dimensions, we exploit additional information at the 
individual level provided by the ISTAT Multiscopo survey. In particular, we consider four 
measures of inequality in services utilization: home care (inequality_home_care), emergency 
care (inequality_emergency_care), inpatient care (inequality_inpatient_care), and contacts with 
Local Health Authority to schedule appointments for outpatient visits, blood tests or other 
laboratory tests (inequality_contacts_LHA). All of these inequality measures are built from 
binary variables indicating whether or not the respondent had used any of the services 
during the twelve months before the interview. To account for the binary nature of these 
variables, we use the concentration index proposed by Erreygers (2009) to build our 
measures of inequality. The Erreygers index E(y) corrects the standard concentration index 
defined by Wagstaff et al. (1991) and Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer (2000).13 The range of the 
Erreygers index E(y) is [−1, 1]. A negative (positive) value indicates a pro-poor (pro-rich) 
inequality; a value of zero indicates that healthcare access is perfectly equally distributed 
among the population. Since we are interested in the magnitude of need-adjusted 
horizontal inequality in healthcare access, we employ the absolute value of the index. 
                                                                          
13 Notice that, differently from the standard concentration index, the Erreygers index does not depend on the 
mean of health, healthcare and health-related behavior variables. This makes it possible to compare regions 
with different averages. Moreover, while the standard concentration index may give conflicting information 
when applied separately to health and ill-health, the Erreygers index satisfies the so called ‘‘mirror property’’, 
namely inequalities in health ‘‘mirrors’’ those in ill-health (Erreygers et al., 2012; Costa-Font et al., 2014). 
Further notice that, since straightforward numeric measures of wealth such as household income are not 
available in the ISTAT survey, we have to use other proxies for the household wealth. In particular, we exploit 
information about assets ownership and living standards collected during the interviews to build a one-
dimensional index of wealth using the Principal Component Analysis (PCA), under the assumption that 
wealth is reflected in the assets owned and in the living conditions within a household. For a detailed 
discussion of how to construct asset indices see Vyas and Kumaranayake (2006). 
 14
Moreover, we standardize utilization considering need factors related to the individuals’ 
health status.14 
Although the role of access to healthcare services in addressing health inequality is widely 
recognized, there is an additional concern about growing differences in lifestyles (e.g., 
Costa-Font et al, 2014; Mackenbach, 2014; Vallejo-Torres et al., 2014). While there exists a 
substantial literature that shows that a healthier lifestyle is one of the main driving factors 
for good health (e.g., Contoyannis and Jones, 2004; Balia and Jones, 2008; Di Novi, 2010), 
little is known about the potential influence that these inequalities in lifestyles may have on 
health inequality. In our study we consider two measures of lifestyle differences: an index 
for differences in diet (inequality_diet) and an index for differences in smoking 
(inequality_smoke).These inequality measures are built from individual level variables 
provided by the ISTAT Multiscopo survey. As for diet, we use a binary variable that takes 
value one if the respondent does not eat breakfast nearly every day and zero otherwise.15 To 
measure smoking behavior we also employ a binary variable that takes value one if the 
respondent is currently a smoker and zero otherwise. Following Costa-Font et al. (2014), to 
account for the bounded nature of the health-related behavior variables (between 0 and 1), 
we again apply the Erreygers (2009) index. Additionally, in order to have a measure of 
lifestyle differences reflecting only non-demographic factors, we use the indirect method of 
standardization discussed above. Finally, as before, since we are interested only in the 
magnitude of differences in unhealthy habits, regardless of the sign (pro-poor or pro-rich), 
in the final regression model we include the absolute value of the two lifestyle-related 
indexes. 
Table 2 shows that inequalities in healthcare access are pro-poor and close to zero, except 
for contacts with Local Health Authority to schedule appointments, which tends to be pro-
                                                                          
14 In other words, instead of using the actual measure of healthcare access, we consider a “corrected” measure 
accounting for differences in needs. To this end, we start by estimating a probit model controlling for the 
determinants of healthcare access for each region and for each year survey. We categorize the explicative 
variables used to predict the demand for healthcare services into three main dimensions: need factors related 
to individuals’ health status (age, gender, self-assessed health and health conditions), social characteristics 
(education and marital status), and enabling/disabling factors (private health insurance, employment status, 
wealth, difficulties in accessing healthcare services due to distance, monetary costs, or waiting times). We then 
standardize access by need factors related to individuals’ health status to obtain an estimate of potentially 
avoidable inequality (see also O’Donnell et al., 2008). The standardisation allows for exploring whether lower 
socioeconomic groups are less likely to access healthcare than higher socioeconomic groups, keeping needs 
constant. After standardisation, any residual inequality in healthcare access is interpretable as horizontal 
inequity (which could be pro-rich or pro-poor). 
15 Belloc and Breslow (1972) in their epidemiological study based on the Alameda County survey carried out 
in California in 1965, found that people who eat breakfast almost every day reported better overall physical 
health status than breakfast skippers. 
 15
rich. Looking at the dynamics of the indexes during the observed period, inequalities tend 
to increase over time, especially for regions with GDP per-capita below the sample mean 
value, which generally present greater inequality in access even when pro-poor.16 
Consistent with the previous literature, differences in unhealthy lifestyles also appear to be 
concentrated among the poor and tend to be higher in poorer regions over time. 
Demographic and socio-economic characteristics at the regional level, and summary 
information on regional health policies, are other important variables which may influence 
the inequality in health status and are included in Xit. To control for these factors, we use 
data at the regional level from the ISTAT “Health for All - Italy” database. In particular, in 
our econometric model we control for variables capturing: (i) demographic characteristics 
of the regional population, namely the percentage of individuals older than 65 
(population_over65) and the percentage of foreign-born residents (population_foreign); (ii) 
disposable income, namely the percentage of low educated individuals 
(population_primaryedu, the share of population with at most a primary school certificate 
according to ISCED classification) and the employment rate (population_employment, the 
share of individuals older than 15 who were employed during the year of the interview)17; 
(iii) the consumption rate of prescription drugs (drug_consumption, the share of individuals 
who consumed drugs in the two days before the interview); and (iv) the level of public 
health expenditure per-capita (health_spending).  
Summary statistics for all variables included in the estimated models are in Table 2. 
Approximately 20% of the sample are over 65, and only about 2% are foreign-born. The 
percentage of people with a low level of education is relatively small (about 28%), while 
more than 40% of individuals were employed during the year of the interview. 
Approximately one in three consumed drugs within two days before the interview, and the 
average public health expenditure per-capita is around 1200 euro over the whole sample 
period. 
  
                                                                          
16 Descriptive statistics for inequality indexes disaggregated by years and regions are not reported for sake of 
brevity but are available on request. 
17 These two variables will serve as proxies for private health spending, which cannot be included directly 
because it is likely to be endogenous. 
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
KM index 0.399 0.031 0.291 0.470 
GDP (€) 19,801 5748 9072 33,122 
DECENTR 0.692 0.463 0 1 
inequality_home_care -0.009 0.015 -0.054 0.054 
inequality_emergency_care -0.010 0.021 -0.078 0.062 
inequality_contacts_LHA 0.028 0.058 -0.121 0.297 
inequality_inpatient_care -0.012 0.016 -0.054 0.030 
inequality_diet -0.013 0.029 -0.130 0.064 
inequality_smoke -0.013 0.046 -0.142 0.138 
population_over65 (%) 19.345 3.121 12.090 26.740 
population_foreign (%) 2.313 1.815 0.280 7.590 
population_primaryedu (%) 28.170 16.327 0.363 46.930 
population_employment (%) 42.918 5.924 31.590 53.270 
drug_consumption (%) 34.720 4.806 24.750 45.320 
health_spending (€) 1234 326 694 2014 
Nr. Observations 195    
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of the variables used in model [1] 
5. Results 
5.1. Baseline results 
Table 3 shows the estimated impact of fiscal decentralization on within-regional health 
inequalities under alternative specifications of Equation [1]. All of these specifications 
include the set of possible confounding factors Xit, regional fixed effects Ri, and year fixed 
effects Tt, to account for unobserved residual heterogeneity across regions as well as the 
presence of a common time trend.18 MODEL 1 refers to the baseline specification of 
equation [1], without any controls for possible anticipatory effects (leads) or post-treatment 
effects (lags). MODELS 2 to 5 test the robustness of the baseline results by including q leads 
and m lags of the treatment. More precisely, following Angrist and Pischke (2009), all the 
models account for three anticipatory effects (GDP× 1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP× 2 Years Prior = 
1996, GDP× 3 Years Prior = 1995). As for the lags, MODEL 2 includes only one post-treatment 
                                                                          
18 As anticipated in section 3, we have verified that the fitted values of the inequality index from the estimated 
models stay inside the interval [0. 1]. This is the case for all the specifications presented in Table 3, with values 
ranging from 0.328 to 0.463. Our linear model appears to be an acceptable representation of the data-
generating process. 
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effect (GDP× 1 or More Years After = 1999-2007); MODEL 3 includes two post-treatment 
effects (GDP× 1 or More Years After = 1999, GDP× 2 or More Years After = 2000-2007); MODEL 
4 includes three post-treatment effects (GDP× 1 or More Years After = 1999, GDP× 2 or More 
Years After = 2000, GDP× 3 or More Years After = 2001-2007);  MODEL 5 includes four post-
treatment effects (GDP× 1 or More Years After = 1999, GDP× 2 or More Years After = 2000, 
GDP× 3 or More Years After = 2001, GDP× 4 or More Years After = 2002-2007).  Finally, in all 
the models GDP× Year of Adoption refers only to the effect of tax decentralization observed in 
1998, when the reform was implemented.  
 
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR   -2.160** (0.847) -  -  -  -  
GDP×3 Years Prior  -   -3.005 (2.822) -3.592 (2.820) -3.490 (2.845) -3.670 (2.950) 
GDP×2 Years Prior  -   -2.231 (1.941) -2.963 (1.920) -2.817 (1.929) -3.022 (2.047) 
GDP×1 Year Prior -   -2.091 (2.617) -2.982 (2.598) -2.871 (2.614) -3.013 (2.707) 
GDP×Year of Adoption  -   -3.289 (2339)  -4.347* (2.237)   -4.174* (2.249)   -4.409* (2.357) 
GDP×1 or More Years After  -     -5.059* (2.453)  -3.887* (2.172) -3.697 (2.201) -3.996 (2.330) 
GDP×2 or More Years After  -   -     -7.253** (2.444)  -7.623***   (2.570)   -7.947**     (2.730) 
GDP×3 or More Years After -   -   -     -6.729**    (2.458)   -6.429**     (2.228) 
GDP×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -     -7.449**     (2.970) 
Within R2 0.48   0.49   0.52   0.52  0.53  
Nr. of observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 
Table 3. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities (a) 
(a) The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level 
are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline 
specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More 
Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to 
time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 
in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption 
refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
The estimates in Table 3 show that the different specifications provide a consistent picture. 
Looking at MODEL 1, the coefficient on the interaction GDP×DECENTR is negative and 
statistically significant. Given the evolution characterizing within-regional inequality, this 
means that the tax decentralization reform helped contain disparities within regions. As 
discussed above, this result might hide differences in pre-trends and/or in post-treatment 
effects that are not controlled for in the baseline model. However, looking at the extended 
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specifications (MODELS 2-5), coefficients for the three leads are always statistically 
insignificant, supporting the common trend assumption underlying our empirical strategy. 
In all the models except MODEL 2 the estimated coefficient for the year of adoption of the 
reform (GDP× Year of Adoption) is negative and statistically significant. More importantly, 
coefficients for the lags reveal that the magnitude of the impact increases in the years after 
the introduction of the reform, supporting the idea that it takes time for the reform to 
completely generate its effects. In particular, the impact of the reform on within-regional 
health inequalities is almost two times larger after two years from its adoption (coefficient 
for GDP× 2 or More Years After) and then remains fairly constant at this new level.  
The Average Treatment Effect, computed at the sample mean value of GDP in the years 
from 1998 to 2007, points to a reduction in KM of almost three times its within-region 
standard deviation, computed over the same time period. The effect clearly differs 
according to the exposure to the treatment, with much stronger effects in richer regions 
compared to poorer ones. Looking at the two extreme cases for instance, the reform caused 
a reduction in KM which varies from about one and a half times the within standard 
deviation for the region with the lowest per capita GDP (Calabria, on average 14,238 euro 
over the period 1998-2007) to about six times the within standard deviation for the region 
with the highest per capita GDP (Lombardy, on average 29,272 euro). As the theory 
predicted, the decentralization reform had more pronounced effects in the regions that 
experienced a substantial increase in their fiscal autonomy; and these effects were not 
enough to contrast the increasing inequalities in poorer regions. This finding suggests that 
the increased accountability of regional governments was beneficial not only to foster 
efficiency, but also to avoid the deterioration of within-region inequalities.  
As for the role played by the controls, results are also consistent across the different models, 
with most coefficients statistically insignificant.19 Of the six inequality indexes, only 
inequality in home care is positively correlated – as expected – with KM, while we do not 
find evidence of statistically significant effects for the remaining variables. Looking at 
regional characteristics, the estimates show that KM increases with the consumption rate of 
drugs. This result might be due to the fact that the assessment of own health conditions is 
likely to be more heterogeneous within the group of drug consumers, in which there are 
both people who use drugs for minor ailments and people with serious diseases. 
  
                                                                          
19 The coefficients for the whole set of controls are presented in Appendix Table A.1. 
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5.2. Robustness checks 
Our results might be influenced by different important sources of bias. First of all, as 
discussed in section 4.1, the use of current GDP as a measure for the degree of exposure to 
treatment (DECENTR) can raise endogeneity concerns; secondly, some regions might have 
used deficits to inflate spending in health care, and this increased spending might have 
influenced health outcomes as well; thirdly, a reform impacting on the financing 
mechanism of hospitals – which deployed its effects since 2007 – might have produced 
better outcomes in richer regions. We consider all of these issues in turn. As a final check, 
we estimate all models additionally including Special Statute Regions in our sample, and 
compare the results with those obtained from estimations using the original sample of 
Ordinary Statute Regions.  
 
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
PRE×DECENTR -2.950*** (0.753) -   -   -   -  
PRE×3 Years Prior  -   -2.611 (2.476) -2.673 (2.440) -2.660 (2.460) -2.724 (2.503) 
PRE×2 Years Prior  -   -1.727 (1.611) -1.697 (1.637) -1.679 (1.651) -1.717 (1.672) 
PRE×1 Year Prior -   -1.549 (2.383) -1.632 (2.333) -1.675 (2.373) -1.652 (2.351) 
PRE×Year of Adoption  -   -3.009 (1.996) -3.022 (1.910) -3.035 (1.950) -3.053 (1.962) 
PRE×1 or More Years After  -   -4.951** (1.998) -2.488 (1.831) -2.470 (1.872) -2.551 (1.899) 
PRE×2 or More Years After  -   -   -5.816** (1.997) -6.790** (2.339) -6.815** (2.345) 
PRE×3 or More Years After -   -   -   -5.398** (1.943) -4.716** (1.708) 
PRE×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -   -5.854** (2.317) 
Within R2 0.47   0.49   0.51   0.52  0.52  
Nr. of observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 
Table 4. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities                                    
controlling for the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous GDP  (a) 
(a) The effect of the potential endogeneity of contemporaneous GDP is tested by defining the variable PRE as the average regional 
GDP over the pre-reform period 1994-1997. The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). Cluster–
robust standard errors at the Region level are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional and 
year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 
Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in 
MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 
or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers 
to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
We address the issue of the potential endogeneity of current GDP by utilising the average of 
regional GDP prior to the reform. In particular, we define the variable PRE as the average 
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regional GDP over the period 1994-1997. We then replace the variable GDP with the 
variable PRE in all models. The estimates of this new version of Eq. [1] are reported in Table 
4 and largely confirm the baseline findings in terms of sign, statistical significance and 
magnitude of the impact of the reform, which suggests that our estimates are not biased by 
potential endogeneity of the treatment variable. 
 
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR   -2.207* (1.266) -  -  -  -  
GDP×3 Years Prior  -   -4.000 (2.969) -4.602 (2.954) -4.526 (2.968) -4.684 (3.041) 
GDP×2 Years Prior  -   -2.987 (2.253) -3.682 (2.227) -3.579 (2.219) -3.729 (2.270) 
GDP×1 Year Prior -   -2.271 (2.784) -3.175 (2.838) -3.093 (2.847) -3.208 (2.887) 
GDP×Year of Adoption  -   -3.945 (2.647)  -4.927* (2.491)  -4.789* (2.483)  -4.993* (2.549) 
GDP×1 or More Years After  -    -5.825* (2.705)  -4.734* (2.375)  -4.583* (2.384)  -4.844* (2.457) 
GDP×2 or More Years After  -   -     -7.845** (2.691)   -8.336** (2.876)   -8.558** (2.941) 
GDP×3 or More Years After -   -   -         -7.376** (2.654)   -6.831** (2.373) 
GDP×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -     -8.164** (3.118) 
Within R2 0.50   0.53   0.55   0.55  0.55  
Nr. of observations 169   169   169   169   169   
 
Table 5. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities                                      
excluding Regions with a high deficit in the post-reform period (a) 
(a) The excluded Regions (Lazio and Campania) are those whose deficits for health spending in the period 1998-2007 summed up to 
more than 50% of the whole aggregated deficit computed for all Regions. The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-
assessed health (KM). Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level are reported in round brackets. All models include the 
vector of control X, regional and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, 
GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 
and only to year 1999 in MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 
in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or 
More Years After refers to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 
1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
Secondly, we consider the issue of regional deficits by considering a reduced sample which 
excludes Lazio and Campania, the two regions whose deficits for health spending in the 
period 1998-2007 (after the reform was implemented) summed up to more than 50% of the 
whole aggregated deficit for healthcare in Italy (Tediosi et al., 2009). Table 5 shows the 
estimates of Equation [1] on this reduced sample. Our initial results are confirmed again: 
the tax reform caused a containment of within-regional health inequalities more 
pronounced in rich regions compared to poor ones; moreover, the magnitude of the impact 
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increases over time and is almost double after two years of the introduction on the new 
regional taxes. 
 
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR    -2.308** (0.908) -  -  -  -  
GDP×3 Years Prior  -   -3.055 (2.824)   -3.647 (2.826) -3.545 (2.852) -3.752 (2.967) 
GDP×2 Years Prior  -   -2.273 (1.951)   -3.011 (1.933) -2.866 (1.945) -3.098 (2.075) 
GDP×1 Year Prior -   -2.429 (2.652)   -3.348 (2.632) -3.216 (2.664) -3.448 (2.809) 
GDP×Year of Adoption  -   -3.682 (2.327)   -4.773* (2.249)  -4.576* (2.281)  -4.922* (2.452) 
GDP×1 or More Years After  -     -5.469** (2.549)   -4.325* (2.296)  -4.112* (2.354)  -4.529* (2.541) 
GDP×2 or More Years After  -   -   -7.702*** (2.563) -8.031*** (2.641) -8.474** (2.872) 
GDP×3 or More Years After -   -   -   -7.164** (2.650) -6.936** (2.444) 
GDP×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -   -8.041** (3.244) 
Within R2 0.48   0.50   0.52   0.53  0.53  
Nr. Of observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 
Table 6. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities                                    
controlling also for the effect of the quasi-markets reform  (a) 
(a) The effect of the quasi-markets reform is tested by including in the vector of controls X also a dummy variable QM equal to one 
when the Regions adopt their own set of DRG tariffs. The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). 
Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional 
and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 
Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in MODELS 
3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More 
Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers to time 
period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
We next consider the potential source of bias stemming from the quasi-market reform 
implemented in Italy during the Nineties. This reform, inspired by the UK experience, was 
aimed at improving spending efficiency (the same goal of the tax decentralization reform) 
working at a more micro level. In particular, it was hoped that the introduction of a new 
prospective payment scheme for hospitals with fixed prices based on Diagnosis Related 
Groups, would increase spending efficiency. The new payment system became effective in 
1997, and regions were allowed to differentiate tariffs with respect to national prices. 
However, few regions introduced their own tariffs and those that did, did so at different 
times: in particular, some of the richest regions (Lombardy and Emilia Romagna) were 
among the first to adopt their own set of tariffs beginning in 1997, followed by Veneto in 
1998. We exploit this variability across regions and years in the adoption of own tariffs to 
define the dummy variable QM, (quasi-markets), taking value one when a region adopted a 
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set of tariffs different from the national ones. Table 6 presents the estimates obtained from 
an augmented version of Eq. [1], which also includes the variable QM among the covariates. 
Our results are largely confirmed in this case, in terms of sign, magnitude and significance. 
Moreover, the coefficient of the variable QM is never statistically significant at the usual 
confidence levels, suggesting that the introduction of quasi-markets did not have any 
impact on inequalities. This finding is in line with Cappellari et al. (2016), who show that 
price incentives introduced by the quasi-markets reform did not affect perceived health. 
The authors argue that the quasi-market reform reduced inappropriate access to some 
services, with stronger effects in the first years immediately after the reform in regions that 
adopted their own set of tariffs. 
  
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR -1.878** (0.790) -   -   -   -  
GDP× 3 Years Prior  -   -1.641 (1.966)  -2.086 (1.990) -2.037 (2.001) -2.063 (2.072) 
GDP× 2 Years Prior  -   -1.750 (1.608)  -2.349 (1.745) -2.280 (1.778) -2.317 (1.888) 
GDP× 1 Year Prior -   -0.454 (1.935)  -1.192 (2.016) -1.114 (2.029) -1.146 (2.139) 
GDP× Year of Adoption  -   -2.105 (1.801)  -2.954 (1.934) -2.861 (1.966) -2.906 (2.095) 
GDP× 1 or More Years After  -    -3.345* (1.918)  -2.314 (1.738) -2.220 (1.763) -2.278 (1.930) 
GDP× 2 or More Years After  -   -   -5.082** (2.246) -5.268** (2.224) -5.332** (2.408) 
GDP× 3 or More Years After -   -   -   -4.820* (2.345) -4.740** (2.138) 
GDP× 4 or More Years After -   -   -   -   -4.957* (2.810) 
Within R2 0.50   0.51   0.52   0.53  0.53  
Nr. of observations 247   247   247   247   247   
 
Table 7. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities considering also Special 
Status Regions in the sample (a) 
(a) The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level 
are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline 
specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More 
Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to 
time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 
in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption 
refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
 
Finally, Table 7 reports the estimates of Eq. [1] on a larger sample which also includes the 
Special Statute Regions (Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige in the North, 
Sardinia and Sicily in the South). These regions differ markedly in terms of population and 
GDP per-capita, but most of all in terms of the specific fiscal relationships they maintain 
 23
with the central government.20 Although the main conclusions of our study are still valid, 
all coefficients of interest are now lower in magnitude than those obtained in Table 3. This is 
consistent with the fact that Special Statute Regions are largely unaffected by the fiscal 
decentralization reform, and thus their inclusion in the sample is expected to dilute the 
estimated average treatment effect. 
5.3. Discussion 
In this section we discuss some of the potential mechanisms that can explain why tax 
decentralization helped contain within-regional inequalities in health outcomes more in rich 
regions than in poor ones. The modern theories of fiscal decentralization suggest a story of 
incentives: local officials that need to raise more resources via own revenue are more 
accountable to their citizens. In turn, more accountable politicians might provide market-
enhancing public goods, which positively influence economic growth at the local level; or 
they might offer better and more easy-to-access health care services; or they might supply 
more appropriate and more targeted services because of better governance. We explore 
each of these explanations in turn. 
A first possible mechanism underlying the relationship between increased accountability of 
regional governments and the ability to contain health disparities may be related to regional 
economic growth (e.g., Akai and Sakata, 2002; Weingast, 2009). A higher degree of fiscal 
autonomy might have stimulated growth at the local level. A higher income, in turn, might 
have affected private health spending. We follow two strategies to investigate formally the 
validity of this argument. Firstly, we test the impact of decentralization on both per capita 
GDP and private health spending by estimating a model mirroring Equation [1] with a 
complete set of leads and lags of the treatment, where the effect of the tax reform is allowed 
to be different in rich and poor regions (used as the treated and control groups, 
respectively). In particular, we define the dummy variable RICH to identify regions with 
per-capita income above the sample mean, and interact this variable with DECENTR, the 
indicator of the post-decentralization period. As expected, for both variables we found a 
large difference in the trend of growth between the two groups of regions, but no evidence 
of any divergence caused by decentralization: per capita GDP and private health spending 
grew more in the North than in the South over the entire 1994-2007 period (Appendix Table 
                                                                          
20 For instance, the two autonomous provinces making up Trentino Alto Adige retain almost all the revenues 
they raise in their territory, receiving virtually no transfers from the central government, and also having 
spending autonomy on education. On the contrary, Sicily receives transfers from the central government even 
if it retains revenues and does not have spending autonomy on education.  
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A.2). To confirm this finding, we also re-estimated our original models in Table 3 by 
substituting per capita public spending with per capita total spending for health care. 
Baseline results are generally unaffected when considering total spending instead of public 
spending (Appendix Table A.4). These results provide no evidence to support the 
hypothesis that the differential effect of fiscal decentralization is driven by an “income” 
effect. 
A second possible mechanism is patient migration. Suppose that – following the reform – 
increased accountability induced local politicians in the richest regions to provide even 
better services, increasing the differential in terms of quality with respect to poor regions21. 
Patient-inflow from poor regions would then have increased, exacerbating disparities in the 
Mezzogiorno among patients able to migrate to other regions (likely the richer) and those 
who are not (the poorer). Brekke et al. (2016) provide a similar argument in a model where 
regions are fully responsible for financing their healthcare systems and spending is 
completely funded with local resources. In particular, the authors show that, if inter-
regional inequality increases, then we will observe an increase in the quality of services in 
high-income regions and an opposite effect in low income regions. Under this hypothesis, 
the effect in the high-income region is driven by the increase in income: quality 
improvements will be financed by the increase in local taxation, since the marginal cost of 
taxation is now lower. The improved quality will then trigger an increase in patient 
mobility from low-income regions. Parallel effects will be observed if intra-regional 
inequality in income increases. 
As already observed, income inequality across regions does not play a direct role in the case 
of the Italian NHS, since a system of equalization grants to supply the same set of quasi-
universal services is in place. In the presence of equalization grants, an increase in inter-
regional inequality will increase the reliance of  rich-regions on their own resources, and 
poor regions will receive additional transfers from the center. Moreover, rich regions did 
not seem to have exploited fiscal autonomy given the mandatory quasi-universal set of 
services to be provided in all regions. However, we investigate formally the validity of 
patient migration as a potential explanation of our findings by considering the 
compensation mechanism in place in Italy to account for the free choice of patients. Suppose 
that a patient migrates from Region i in the South to Region j in the North. If this occurs, 
Region i must compensate Region j for the treatment provided to the patient paying a tariff 
                                                                          
21 We will discuss the empirical validity of this hypothesis below. 
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defined at the national level. We consider total net compensations received by each region 
in a model including a full set of leads and lags, allowing the impact of the tax reform to be 
different in rich and poor regions (categorised as the treated and control groups, 
respectively) again using the dummy RICH. The relevant coefficients are insignificant, 
suggesting that patients’ migration cannot explain our findings (Appendix Table A.2).  
This argument is further supported by an additional model designed to check whether the 
perceived quality of health services changed differently after the tax reform in rich and poor 
regions (Appendix Table A.3). If the quality differential has widened, then inequality might 
have increased even without any changes in the outflow of patients. However, there is no 
evidence of any significant differential changes in patient satisfaction for medical and 
nursing care, nor for the cleanliness of hospital toilets that could justify the increase in 
inequality in the absence of any changes in migration flows from poor to rich regions.  
Finally, a third explanation is based on the idea that more accountable politicians will 
supply more appropriate and more targeted services, improving the governance of the 
regional healthcare system. In this respect, regional screening programs for cancer 
prevention – in particular, the malignant tumors affecting breast, colon and uterus – 
represent an interesting policy issue to consider. For instance, breast cancer is one of the 
most important concerns for health in Europe because of its high incidence and mortality 
(e.g., Ferlay et al., 2013). Moreover, recent empirical evidence highlights that inequalities in 
the use of mammography are stronger in countries like Italy that does not have a national 
screening program; and the effectiveness of these programs in increasing preventive use is 
higher among the women with lower education (e.g., Carrieri and Wuebker, 2016). In 
general, this suggests that if – following fiscal decentralization – rich regions were more 
able to introduce effective screening programs, we expect to observe a higher increase of 
cancer prevention rates and citizens’ health in these regions; and the difference with respect 
to poor regions should be particularly marked for less educated people. As those less 
educated are presumably also poorer individuals, unlikely to turn to private providers to 
purchase out-of-pocket screening tests, this might help explain why in Southern regions we 
observe a deterioration of health inequalities relative to Northern ones.  
Unfortunately, we cannot directly test the effects of fiscal decentralization on cancer 
prevention rates, as we do not have yearly information on the adherence to screening 
programs in the period before and after the tax reform for individuals with different 
education levels. However, individual-level data from the 1994–2007 Multiscopo ISTAT 
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survey (from which we defined the inequality indexes) allow us to directly test the 
potentially heterogeneous impact of fiscal decentralization on SAH and on the utilization of 
different health services across different population sub-groups in terms of education. 
Services are broadly defined to include home care, emergency care, inpatient care and 
contacts with the Local Health Authority to schedule appointments for outpatient visits, 
blood tests or other laboratory tests. 
The estimates on sub-samples defined by the level of education (Appendix Table A.5) point 
to an increase in the probability of individuals with low and medium education to be 
healthier after the tax reform (even if the coefficient GDP×DECENTR is statistically 
significant only for the second group), and this effect is more pronounced for those living in 
richer regions. Moreover, following fiscal decentralization, low- and medium-educated 
people in richer regions scheduled more appointments with the Local Health Authority 
(e.g., for taking prevention tests) and accessed more home care services, while reducing 
more the utilization of inpatient care and emergency care services. Overall, this evidence is 
consistent with the hypothesis that more accountable politicians in richer regions have been 
able to supply more appropriate and more targeted services. 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on between- and within-
regional inequalities in health outcomes. To this aim, we exploit a 1998 reform implemented 
by the Italian government which substituted some central government transfers with two 
new sources of autonomous revenue for regions. Using self-reported health as an outcome, 
we show that fiscal decentralization did not affect between-regional inequalities but 
contributed to a significant containment of within-regional health inequalities. However, 
the magnitude of the estimated impact differs according to the level of affluence of each 
region, with stronger effects in rich regions compared to poor ones. The finding supports 
the view that the outcomes of fiscal decentralization (in terms of both efficiency and equity) 
depends on the level of development, which eventually determines the real degree of fiscal 
autonomy (e.g., Bardhan, 2002; Rodrıguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010). Rich regions are those 
where a large share of spending is financed with own revenues, which favours the increase 
in the accountability of local politicians, who then provide more appropriate and more 
targeted services, improving the governance of the healthcare system. In poor regions, 
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monies keep flowing from the central government, producing no effects in terms of 
accountability, and the governance remains weak. 
Our evidence has important implications for the debate on decentralization, in Italy as in 
other countries. In most cases, the constitutional mandate attributing the power to manage 
the provision of services is common across jurisdictions, independent of their fiscal 
capacity. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that – following fiscal decentralization – the 
change in revenue composition can differ substantially across jurisdictions, as can the effect 
in terms of accountability. In countries where the differences are wide, one might then 
observe improvements in some territories, and no (or less) effects in others, as our estimates 
clearly show. 
Where differences in fiscal capacity are wide, one should re-think decentralization, backing 
an institutional design of a “two-way” decentralization. For the richer regions of the 
country, one can decentralize spending and contemporaneously strengthen tax autonomy; 
eventually one can expect to obtain better outcomes, via the improved fiscal accountability 
following the substantial increase in autonomy. In contrast, for the less developed regions, it 
would be better to first implement growth-enhancing policies aimed at reducing the gap 
with more developed regions in terms of fiscal capacity, and only then move on to policies 
that target spending (and tax) decentralization. According to this view, the recipe for the 
Italian Mezzogiorno would be less decentralization, not more, since in these regions, fiscal 
decentralization will not lead to any meaningful effects in terms of accountability nor the 
desired improvements to services. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR   -2.160** (0.847) -  -  -  -  
GDP×3 Years Prior  -   -3.005 (2.822) -3.592 (2.820) -3.490 (2.845) -3.670 (2.950) 
GDP×2 Years Prior  -   -2.231 (1.941) -2.963 (1.920) -2.817 (1.929) -3.022 (2.047) 
GDP×1 Year Prior -   -2.091 (2.617) -2.982 (2.598) -2.871 (2.614) -3.013 (2.707) 
GDP×Year of Adoption  -   -3.289 (2339)  -4.347* (2.237)   -4.174* (2.249)   -4.409* (2.357) 
GDP×1 or More Years After  -     -5.059* (2.453)  -3.887* (2.172) -3.697 (2.201) -3.996 (2.330) 
GDP×2 or More Years After  -   -     -7.253** (2.444)  -7.623***   (2.570)   -7.947**     (2.730) 
GDP×3 or More Years After -   -   -     -6.729**    (2.458)   -6.429**     (2.228) 
GDP×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -     -7.449**     (2.970) 
inequality_home_care  0,171** (0,070)    0,200** (0,077)  0,183** (0,078)    0,184** (0,077)  0,193** (0,078) 
inequality_emergency_care -0,005 (0,078) 0,024 (0,097) 0,061 (0,092) 0,061 (0,091) 0,070 (0,090) 
inequality_contacts_LHA -0,017 (0,037) -0,013 (0,034) -0,009 (0,032) -0,011 (0,033) -0,006 (0,035) 
inequality_inpatient_care 0,029 (0,095) 0,027 (0,096) 0,029 (0,099) 0,021 (0,101) 0,034 (0,099) 
inequality_diet -0,031 (0,088) -0,026 (0,088) -0,063 (0,086) -0,067 (0,088) -0,049 (0,085) 
inequality_smoke 0,063 (0,047) 0,069 (0,055) 0,057 (0,057) 0,059 (0,058) 0,058 (0,057) 
population_over65 0,005 (0,009) 0,004 (0,008) 0,004 (0,008) 0,003 (0,007) 0,004 (0,007) 
population_foreign -0,006 (0,004) -0,005 (0,003) -0,004 (0,003) -0,005 (0,003) -0,004 (0,003) 
population_primaryedu -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) 
population_employment -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) -0,001 (0,001) 
drug_consumption   0,002* (0,001)   0,002* (0,001)   0,002* (0,001)   0,002* (0,001)   0,002* (0,001) 
health_spending 0,000 (0,000) 0,000 (0,000) 0,000 (0,000) 0,000 (0,000) 0,000 (0,000) 
Within R2 0.48   0.49   0.52   0.52  0.53  
Nr. of observations 195   195   195   195   195   
 
Appendix Table A.1. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities  
(estimated coefficients of control variables included) (a) 
(a) The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level 
are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline 
specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More 
Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to 
time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 
in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption 
refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
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 per-capita GDP 
per-capita  
private health spending 
cross-regional             
patient mobility 
RICH×3 Years Prior     693.034*** (115.422)    8.859***   (2.519) -68.989 (87.264) 
RICH×2 Years Prior  1135.890*** (199.197) 27.040***   (3.521) -84.881 (44.946) 
RICH×1 Year Prior 1324.592*** (243.596) 45.269***   (6.045)   -1.848 (15.052) 
RICH×Year of Adoption  1667.697*** (235.290) 55.450***   (8.224)   -7.637 (20.757) 
RICH×1 Year After  1829.779*** (225.097) 57.508***   (8.281)  18.113 (24.591) 
RICH×2 Years After  2585.038*** (404.132) 74.315*** (12.253)   -3.705 (13.635) 
RICH×3 Years After 2944.872*** (398.671) 73.634*** (11.646) -35.205 (30.642) 
RICH×4 or More Years After 3692.900*** (466.159) 77.744*** (15.786)   45.211 (48.693) 
Within R2 0.98  0.95  0.17  
Nr. of observations 195   195   195   
 
Appendix Table A.2. The impact of fiscal decentralization on regional per-capita GDP, private 
health spending, and cross-regional patient mobility (a) 
 
(a) Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level are reported in round brackets. RICH is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
regions with average per-capita income above the sample mean value (treated group) and 0 for those with income below the 
sample mean value (control group). All models include regional and year FE. All estimated models consider leads (RICH×3 
Years Prior = 1995, RICH×2 Years Prior = 1996, RICH×1 Year Prior = 1997) and lags (RICH×1 Year After = 1999; RICH×2 Years 
After = 2000; RICH×3 Years After = 2001; RICH×4 or More Years After refers to years 2002-2007). RICH×Year of Adoption refers to 
the effect of fiscal decentralization observed in year 1998. 
*** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
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 Satisfaction for     medical care 
Satisfaction for      
nursing care       
Satisfaction for the 
cleanliness of toilets 
RICH ×1 Year After -4.493 (4.958) -5.676 (4.497)  0.273 (4.793) 
RICH ×2 Years After -1.208 (3.391)  0.984 (4.034)  2.218 (3.162) 
RICH ×3 Years After  0.340 (5.157) -0.908 (5.068) -1.478 (5.320) 
RICH ×4 or More Years After  0.272 (2.735)  1.561 (3.067)  2.739 (2.912) 
Within R2 0.20  0.19  0.17  
Nr. of observations 135  135   135   
 
Appendix Table A.3. The impact of fiscal decentralization on satisfaction for medical and nursing 
care and cleanliness of toilets (a) 
  
(a) Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level are reported in round brackets. RICH is a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
regions with average per-capita income above the sample mean value (treated group) and 0 for those with income below the 
sample mean value (control group). All models include regional and year FE. Information on health services satisfaction is 
available only for the years from 1998 to 2007. All estimated models consider lags of the tax reform (RICH×1 Year After = 1999; 
RICH×2 Years After = 2000; RICH×3 Years After = 2001; RICH×4 or More Years After refers to years 2002-2007) and the effect in 
the year of adoption (1998) is taken as reference point. 
*** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
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Regressors MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
GDP×DECENTR   -2.264** (0.878) -  -  -  -  
GDP×3 Years Prior  -    -3.049 (2.861)  -3.626 (2.845) -3.521 (2.868) -3.718 (2.976) 
GDP×2 Years Prior  -    -2.333 (1.971)  -3.060 (1.951) -2.901 (1.954) -3.142 (2.087) 
GDP×1 Year Prior -    -2.272 (2.670)  -3.140 (2.642) -3.006 (2.652) -3.200 (2.771) 
GDP× Year of Adoption  -    -3.499 (2.455)  -4.538* (2.361)  -4.337* (2.357)  -4.638* (2.490) 
GDP×1 or More Years After  -    -5.296* (2.544)  -4.082* (2.236)  -3.863* (2.250)  -4.232* (2.406) 
GDP×2 or More Years After  -   -      -7.505** (2.578)   -7.825** (2.705)   -8.232** (2.893) 
GDP×3 or More Years After -   -   -      -6.948** (2.571)   -6.718** (2.382) 
GDP×4 or More Years After -   -   -   -     -7.776** (3.121) 
Within R2 0.48   0.49   0.52   0.52  0.53  
Nr. of observations 195   195   195   247   195   
 
Appendix Table A.4. The impact of fiscal decentralization on health inequalities considering total 
health spending instead of public health spending among the control variables (a) 
(a) The dependent variable is the index of inequality in self-assessed health (KM). Cluster–robust standard errors at the Region level 
are reported in round brackets. All models include the vector of control X, regional and year FE. MODEL 2-5 extend the baseline 
specification to include leads (GDP×1 Year Prior = 1997, GDP×2 Years Prior = 1996, GDP×3 Years Prior = 1995) and lags (GDP×1 or More 
Years After refers to time period 1999-2007 in MODEL 2 and only to year 1999 in MODELS 3-5; GDP×2 or More Years After refers to 
time period 2000-2007 in MODEL 3 and only to year 2000 in MODELS 4-5; GDP×3 or More Years After refers to time period 2001-2007 
in MODEL 4 and only to year 2001 in MODEL 5; GDP×4 or More Years After refers to time period 2002-2007). GDP×Year of Adoption 
refers only to the effect of decentralization observed in year 1998.  
** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
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 High SAH LHA contacts Home care Emergency care Inpatient care 
LOW EDU           
GDP×DECENTR 1.004 (1.133) 2.499** (1.036)  -1.955 (2.250)  -11.402*** (1.378)  -2.762* (1.620) 
Pseudo R2 0.18  0.07  0.14    0.06  0.11  
Nr. of observations 258,767  246,471  287,163    289,914  290,618  
MEDIUM EDU           
GDP×DECENTR 3.645** (1.798) 7.108*** (1.413) 9.768*** (3.730)  -13.138*** (2.167)  -2.390* (1.413) 
Pseudo R2 0.10  0.08  0.11    0.06  0.09  
Nr. of observations 142,482  139,688  140,434    141,555  141,845  
HIGH EDU           
GDP×DECENTR  -4.166 (3.729) 3.953 (2.945) 2.950 (7.776)   -9.342** (4.684) 1.327 (5.530) 
Pseudo R2 0.09  0.06  0.10   0.05  0.10  
Nr. of observations 33,773  33,048  33,269   33,523  33,584  
 
Appendix Table A.5. The impact of fiscal decentralization on individual SAH and healthcare 
services utilization by education level (a) 
 
(a) Probit estimates, robust standard errors in round brackets. High SAH is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual reported a 
good (4) or very good (5) health status; LHA contacts is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the individual had contacts with the Local 
Health Authority to schedule appointments for outpatient visits, blood tests or other laboratory tests during the year of the interview; 
Home care, Emergency care and Inpatient care are analogous dummies indicating whether or not the respondent utilized home care, 
emergency care and inpatient care services. LOW EDU is the sub-sample of individuals with no educational certificates or primary 
school certificate or lower secondary education; MEDIUM EDU is the sub-sample of individuals with upper secondary education or 
high school graduation; HIGH EDU is the sub-sample of individuals with university or postgraduate degree. All models include 
among the covariates socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status) and enabling/disabling factors (employment 
status, wealth, private health insurance, difficulties in accessing healthcare services due to distance, monetary costs, or waiting 
times); when using High SAH as dependent variable, the set of regressors also includes lifestyle indicators (smoking, diet); when 
using healthcare access indicators as dependent variables, the models also account for individuals’ health status (self-assessed health, 
health conditions). 
*** statistically significant at 1%; ** statistically significant at 5%; * statistically significant at 10%. 
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